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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model in which workers acquire hu-
man capital specific to the task they complete. The dynamic nature of the model allows for
differentiation between short and long run effects of offshoring on productivity and labour
market outcomes. The welfare effects of increased offshoring are unambiguously positive;
their magnitude depends on the difference between autarky and world relative prices, but
not on the skill-content of offshored and inshored tasks. For reasonable terms of trade, the
steady state welfare gains are found to be between 1.8% and 4% in the calibrated model. The
distribution of the gains from trade critically depends on the time horizon: in the short term,
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1. Introduction
Technological progress has led to considerable changes in the organization of the production
process – tasks traditionally completed in close physical proximity can now be spatially sep-
arated and carried out independently, thus spurring offshoring of intermediate processes or
tasks. Differently from past trade experiences, “trade in tasks”1 affects not only manufactur-
ing but also high-skill service occupations.2 This has spurred a debate between two oppos-
ing viewpoints, one of which focuses on the long term gains and maintains that offshoring is
productivity-enhancing. The other outlook stresses potential short term losses and warns about
the disruptive effects of offshoring of high skill tasks.
Previous work evaluating claims of either side of the debate has relied mainly on static mod-
els to address the impact of offshoring on productivity and wages and consequently could not
jointly evaluate both short term as well as the long term impacts and the transition between the
two. This paper ascertains that using a dynamic model in which workers accumulate specific
human capital is imperative for assessing the potential devaluation of human capital due to off-
shoring of high skill tasks and for quantifying the magnitude of its short and long term effects on
aggregate productivity and wages.
Differentiating between specific and general human capital is particularly relevant in the
context of worker reallocation due to high-skill offshoring.3 Were reallocated workers’ human
capital mostly general, their loss in productivity would likely be small as they would be able to
apply most of their knowledge to the new task. However, if workers who are exposed to increased
offshoring have relatively more occupation specific human capital, switching occupations may
cause a significant loss in workers’ productivity and wages. Motivated by this observation, I
develop a dynamic general equilibrium model in which workers acquire human capital specific
to the task they are completing.
Different occupations are modeled as islands as in Lucas and Prescott (1974); workers choose
1Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) coined this term for the fragmented global production process.
2In the context of trade in tasks, an occupation is the relevant labour market counterpart; a task is the output of
an occupation.
3See section 3.1. for evidence on the skill-content of tradeable service occupations.
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an occupation to which to apply and enter the occupation with some probability or else remain
unemployed. The model developed in this paper features four sources of heterogeneity in work-
ers: educational attainment, level of occupation specific human capital,4 a match-specific pro-
ductivity draw, and labour market status. This structure allows the model not only to evaluate
aggregate welfare effects, but also distributional effects. First, the fraction of educated work-
ers is fixed, which allows for an assessment of the possible distributional effects arising from
a skill bias in trade.5 Second, the distribution of specific human capital is endogenous, which
generates short run distributional effects which differ from the long run effects. Third, since
the distribution of specific human capital is endogenous and its accumulation is explicitly mod-
elled, the transition from short to long run can be evaluated using the calibrated model. Lastly,
labour market frictions generate unemployment in equilibrium.
Expanding the set of tasks that can be traded triggers a reallocation of workers out of off-
shored and into inshored occupations, causing a loss of specific human capital. Both the in-
crease in unemployment during the reallocation process and the loss of human capital have a
negative impact on aggregate productivity. At the same time, increased trade allows the econ-
omy to exploit its comparative advantage and so generates a positive productivity effect. In the
short run, the total effect depends on the relative magnitude of the negative reallocation and the
positive comparative advantage effects. In the long run, workers reacquire human capital and
unemployment falls to its pre-trade level, so the positive productivity effect prevails.
The magnitude of the aggregate productivity effect depends on differences between autarky
and world relative prices (i.e. the comparative advantage), but not on the skill-content of off-
shored and inshored tasks. For reasonable terms of trade, the steady state gains of increased
offshoring are found to be between 1.8% and 4%, with 2% in the most likely scenario. Yet, work-
ers differ in their specific human capital and match-specific productivity, so increased trade
does have short-run distributional effects. Moving from a state of no trade in services to a new
4For brevity, “specific human capital” in the present environment always denotes occupation specific human
capital.
5The fraction of educated workers need not to be fixed; as long as workers differ in their cost of acquiring an
education, distributional effects may arise.
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trade equilibrium in which high skill service tasks are also tradable, workers employed in import-
competing occupations see their incomes reduced, while workers employed in exported tasks
see their incomes increase. In the same simulation as above, the life-time expected utility of a
worker with human capital specific to the offshored occupation falls by 3.1%, while the life-time
expected utility of a worker with human capital specific to the inshored occupation increases
by 3%. This change in the relative values between occupations causes workers to switch to the
exporting sector. Because of labour market frictions, unemployment increases temporarily and
switching of skilled workers also leads to a loss in specific human capital. Over time, reallocated
agents attain specific human capital anew, which eliminates most of the distributional effects
of reallocation. In the long run, the gains from trade will be shared by all agents through the
competitive nature of the labour market.
The environment most similar to that in this paper is Kambourov (2009), who assesses the
impact of labour market rigidities on the success of trade reforms and calibrates the model to
the Chilean and Mexican trade liberalizations.6 As the goal of the present paper is to examine the
impact of task offshoring on the U.S. economy, the model used here adds substantial worker het-
erogeneity to capture important features of the U.S. labour market. On the other hand, labour
market frictions are modelled much more parsimoniously. An alternative approach to study the
dynamic nature of the reallocation of workers is presented in Cameron et al. (2007), who de-
velop a model with moving costs for workers; their model is estimated and the distributional
effects of a trade reform are studied in Artuc et al. (2007). Also, earlier work on the dynamics of
adjustment after a trade shock includes Mussa (1978) and Matsuyama (1992).
This paper also touches on a variety of other literatures: Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) provide a setting in which to consider fragmentation (“trade in tasks”) and show that
offshoring can generate shared gains for all factors of production. They, however, make the
assumption of full employment. This assumption is relaxed in Mitra and Ranjan (2007), who
demonstrate that in an environment with search frictions offshoring can both increase wages
6A similar environment with occupation specific human capital is also used in Kambourov and Manovskii
(2008a), who investigate the impact of an increase in occupational mobility on wage inequality.
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and lower unemployment if labour is mobile between sectors. On the empirical side, Amiti
and Wei (2006) and Liu and Trefler (2008) have studied employment consequences for offshore
outsourcing in services and found the employment effect is (still) small. Using Swedish data,
Ekholm and Hakkala (2006) find a small negative effect for workers with intermediate levels of
education.
Also closely related to this paper is the recent literature that incorporates search models of
the labour market into trade models.7 These frictions give rise to equilibrium unemployment,
which allows a consideration of the impact of trade on employment and of the distributional
consequences of trade beyond a skill premium. Davidson et al. (2008a, 2008b) suggest a model
in which heterogeneous firms and workers match in a frictional labour market as in Albrecht
and Vroman (2002). In particular, Davidson et al. (2008b) study the impact of offshoring of high
skill employment on labour market outcomes and show that low skilled workers may benefit
from high skill offshoring. Helpman and Itskhoki (2009) and Helpman et al. (2009) study models
in which ex-ante identical workers are matched with heterogonous firms and investigate the
relationship between labour market frictions and comparative advantage, unemployment, and
inequality.
This paper differs from the aforementioned literature in two important ways. While previous
work on trade and the labour market was mostly static in nature and typically either studied the
short or the long run, this paper explicitly focuses on the dynamic nature of factor accumulation
and the redistribution of workers across occupations and skill levels. Furthermore, the goal of
this paper is to provide a model whose labour market structure captures key features in the data
– a model which can be calibrated to quantify the impact of trade in tasks on key labour market
outcomes. As such, it does not aim to explain the actual pattern of trade, but rather takes it as
given.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2. presents a model in which the
distribution of workers across occupations and skill levels is endogenous. Section 3.1. presents
evidence on the skill-content of newly tradable service occupations and the model is calibrated
7This literature goes back to Davidson et al. (1999).
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and several quantitative exercises are undertaken in section 3.2.; section 4. concludes.
2. A Model of Trade in Tasks with Specific Human Capital
In this section, I present a model of trade in tasks (intermediate goods) which incorporates work-
ers’ specific human capital. As a key feature of the model, the distribution of specific human is
not exogenously fixed, but rather arises endogenously as agents choose which task to produce
and for which to acquire specific human capital. Every period, workers may switch occupations
and forego their current specific human capital, while over time acquiring it again for the new
task. Consequently, the distribution of workers across occupations and levels of specific human
capital responds to shocks the economy experiences, such as technological progress and trade.
2.1. The Environment
The economy is populated by a measure 1 of risk-free, infinitely lived agents (workers). Thus,
the agent maximizes
∞∑
t=0
βtct ,
where ct is the consumption of the final good in period t and β < 1 is the time discount factor.
The final consumption good Y is a CES-aggregate of N distinct tasks:
Y =
[
N∑
i=1
κiy
ρ
i
] 1
ρ
,
where κi is a share parameter for each task.
For each task, there is a large number of producers, so both input and output market are
competitive. Labour is the only variable input in the production; there is a also fixed factor for
each task to which each agent holds an equal share. The fixed factor is implied by the decreasing
returns technology, which is needed to asure that occupation task will have a positive mass of
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workers. The representative task producer’s technology is given by:
yi(z, l) = zi(li)α , α < 1,
where zi is a time-invariant task-specific productivity parameter and li is the total effective labour
employed in the occupation.
Human Capital
Ex ante, agents differ only by their general human capital, the level of education; a fractionE has
high education and a fraction (1−E) low education. Highly educated workers can be employed
in any occupation, while low educated workers can only be employed in some. After entering
an occupation, there are two additional sources of heterogeneity between agents. First, upon
entering, agents draw their worker-occupation specific productivity θ from some distribution
Fi(θ); a worker provides θ units of productive time each period. Second, agents differ by their
level of specific human capital. In each occupation, there are two skill-types of workers, those
with acquired specific human capital (skilled workers) and those still unskilled. At the end of
each period (except the first one) the worker may acquire the specific human capital necessary
to become a high skill worker; the arrival rate of the skill shock for an unskilled worker is γ.8
After becoming skilled, a worker remains skilled until she leaves the sector. This captures the
human capital that is specific to the occupation. The increase in productivity upon becoming
skilled varies between occupations, but within an occupation all agents experience the same
relative increase in their productivity. While an unskilled worker has θ units of productive time
each period, a skilled worker has aiθ, ai > 1. A worker can either choose to leave the occupation
or she can get separated exogenously at rate pi; however, it is assumed that at the end of her the
first period in the occupation the worker will not get separated.
At the beginning of each period, an employed worker decides whether to stay in the current
8For the purposes of this paper, an unskilled worker is a worker without specific human capital, whereas a non-
educated worker is one with low education. The occupations that employ (high) educated workers are referred to as
“high education” occupations. Incidentally, in the data, these are also the occupations in which workers acquire the
most specific human capital.
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occupation and keep the current productivity draw θ or become unemployed and search for a
new offer (i.e. try to sample a new productivity draw). There is no time gap between quitting and
searching; a worker who elects to leave her occupation begins searching in the same period. An
unemployed worker chooses the sector to which to apply and with probability (1 − ) receives
an offer θ.9 A worker who receives a productivity draw remains in the occupation for the current
period before deciding whether or not to search again. For an educated worker, the application
process consists of 2 stages. First, an educated worker applies to a high education occupation;
if she receives an offer, the search has ended. However, if she does not receive an offer, she
applies to a low education occupation. This structure captures the empirical observation that
many college graduates start their career in a non-college occupation but stay there only for
a short period of time (see Figure 2.1). The non-educated and unskilled worker’s problem is
summarized in Figure 2.2, the educated and unskilled worker’s problem is summarized in Figure
2.3.
This structure generates a rich pattern of heterogeneity and allows the model to capture key
features of the data, beyond the already discussed specific human capital. This is to address
three key concerns regarding the distribution of the gains from trade. The partition between
educated and non-educated generates an education premium which is potentially affected by
structural changes. Because of the match-specific productivity draw it takes time for workers to
find a “good match”. It also introduces residual income inequality, which has been argued to be
affected by increased trade, a claim that can be investigated using this model.
The labour market friction generates unemployment, both along the transition path and in
equilibrium.
9While there is evidence that workers do not always start working in the occupation they are seeking in their
search process, the longer the time frame, the more likely it is they arrive in an occupation they are targeting. Further-
more, I am interested in the worker relocation resulting from a large, permanent shock and it is more likely agents will
specifically target occupations with a positive shock and avoid those with a negative one; in the steady state, agents
are indifferent between all occupations, so they would be willing to apply for positions in any occupation; only along
the transition path is the assumption of directed search critical.
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2.1.1. The Agent’s Problem
a. Non-Educated Workers
The value of being an unskilled worker in occupation iwith productivity shock θ at the beginning
of a period is given by:
V ui (θ,Σ) = max {Jui (θ,Σ);U(Σ)}, (1)
where
Jui (θ,Σ) = θwi(Σ) + β(1− pi)
(
(1− γi)V ui (θ,Σ′) + γiV si (θ,Σ′)
)
+ βpiU(Σ′) (2)
is the value of staying in occupation i for an unskilled worker,
U(Σ) = max
i
{
(1− i)Eθ
(
J1i (θ,Σ)
)
+ iβU(Σ′)
}
(3)
is the value of being unemployed, and
J1i (θ,Σ) = θwi(Σ) + βV
u
i (θ,Σ
′) (4)
is the value of entering the occupation i with draw θ. wi denotes the real wage per effective unit
of labour in occupation i, so the worker’s income is θwi. Wages are determined competitively
and agents therefore take them as given. Σ(θ) = (σu1 (θ), σ
u
2 (θ)..., σ
s
1(θ), σ
s
2(θ)...) denotes the dis-
tribution of workers across sectors and productivities at the beginning of the period. Eθ denotes
the expectation operator over the possible draws of the productivity shock θ.
Similarly, the value of being a skilled worker in occupation iwith productivity θ at the begin-
ning of a period is given by:
V si (θ,Σ) = max {Jsi (θ,Σ);U(Σ)} , (5)
with Jsi (θ,Σ) = θaiwi(Σ) + β(1− pi)V si (θ,Σ′) + βpiU(Σ′). (6)
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Search is directed, so any occupation that wishes to attract applicants must offer them the
same expected value, so
U(Σ) ≥ (1− i)Eθ
(
J1i (θ,Σ)
)
+ iβU(Σ′). (7)
If the value of applying to occupation i is less than for other occupations, i.e. (7) is not satisfied
as equality for occupation i, no worker will apply and employment will shrink due to the exoge-
nous separation and possible quitting. However, due to a decreasing returns technology, every
sector will have a positive mass of workers and (7) will eventually be satisfied with equality for
all occupations.
Workers are identical, so it is natural to assume that all follow the same application strategy.
However, this implies that if one worker applies to an occupation with probability 1, all workers
would apply to this one occupation and employment in that occupation would increase dras-
tically while it decreases in all the others. Since wages are determined competitively, (7) would
be violated. Therefore, in equilibrium, workers must use a mixed strategy and apply to each oc-
cupation with some probability. Let gA(Σ) denote the policy function describing this optimal
application strategy and A(Σ) the total number of applicants; then Ai(Σ) = gAi (Σ)A(Σ) is the
number of applicants for occupation i.
Since each worker takes the value of search, U(Σ), and the future values V u and V s as given,
the workers optimal quitting decison can be described by a simple reservation productivity strat-
egy: if the productivity draw exceeds the reservation level, the worker remains in the occupation,
otherwise the worker leaves and searches for a better match. These reservation productivity lev-
els (θˆu, θˆs) satisfy
Jui (θˆ
u
i ,Σ) = U(Σ), and (8)
Jsi (θˆ
s
i ,Σ) = U(Σ). (9)
Let gu(θ,Σ) denote the policy function for unskilled workers describing the optimal quitting de-
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cisions, with the convention gui (θ,Σ) = 1 if θ ≥ θˆui . Similarly, gs(θ,Σ) denotes the policy func-
tion for skilled workers. In a stationary equilibrium (see below), two types of workers will be
employed in each occupation – temporary and permanent. Temporary workers are those who
entered at the beginning of the current period, received a low draw and will search again in the
next period, while permanent workers will remain and only leave after an exogenous separation.
As a result, in a stationary environment, skilled workers are always permanent workers.
b. Educated Workers
A fractionE of all workers are educated. Only educated workers can apply to high education oc-
cupations. Furthermore, if an educated worker is employed in a low education occupation she
is more productive than a non-educated worker conditional on the occupation-specific produc-
tivity draw. An educated worker employed in a low education occupation provides acθ efficiency
units of labour if she is unskilled and acaiθ if she is skilled, where ac > 1 is the relative productiv-
ity of an educated to a non-educated worker who is otherwise identical. Alternatively, one can
view the educated worker as drawing from a distribution whose mean is shifted by ac relative to
non-educated workers. For notational convenience, I will adopt this convention – EEθ = acEθ in
low education occupations.10
The value of being unemployed for an educated worker is given by
UE(Σ) = max
h∈H
{
(1− h)Eθ
(
J1h(θ,Σ)
)
+ h max
l∈L
{
(1− l)EEθ
(
JE,1l (θ,Σ)
)
+ lβU(Σ′)
}}
,(10)
where H is the set of high education occupations to which the worker applies first and L is the
set of low education occupations to which the worker applies if she fails to secure an offer in
a high education occupation. Using the same notation as for non-educated workers, JE,1h and
JE,1l denote the value of entering high and low education occupations, respectively.
10A superscriptE denotes educated, while no superscript denotes non-educated.
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Then,
JE,1i (θ,Σ) = θwi(Σ) + βV
E,u
i (θ,Σ
′), (11)
with V E,ui (θ,Σ
′) = max
{
JE,ui (θ,Σ);U
E(Σ)
}
, (12)
and JE,ui (θ,Σ) = θwi(Σ) + β(1− pi)
(
(1− γl)V E,ui (θ,Σ′) + γiV E,si (θ,Σ′)
)
+ βpiUE(Σ′).(13)
After entering a sector and drawing the specific productivity shock, the only difference be-
tween an educated and non-educated worker is the continuation value in case of separation.
As a result, the reservation productivity level for educated and non-educated workers differ; the
reservation productivity levels (θˆE,u, θˆE,s) for the educated satisfy:
JE,ui (θˆ
E,u
i ,Σ) = U
E(Σ), (14)
JE,si (θˆ
E,s
i ,Σ) = U
E(Σ). (15)
Let gE,u(θ,Σ), gE,s(θ,Σ) denote the resulting policy functions.
Again, due to the directed nature of the search process, any high education occupation which
attracts a positive number of applicants must offer at leastU
E(Σ). This condition applies to high
education occupations only; low education occupations which attract non-educated applicants
satisfy (7). Since the productivity premium for educated workers, ac is the same across occupa-
tions and educated and non-educated workers only differ by this constant, (7) also assures that
the educated are indifferent between all low-education occupations in the second stage. Since
educated agents are indifferent between occupations, I assume they follow the same application
strategy as the non-educated in low education occupations in the second stage.
c. Labour Supply
Let gE,A(Σ) denote the policy function describing the optimal application strategy for educated
workers and AEH(Σ) the total number of educated applicants to high skill occupations. Then the
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total number of educated agents applying to low skill occupations is AEL (Σ) = hA
E
H(Σ).
Total labour supply in each occupation is total productive time available in the occupation,
lsi = ai
∫
θ
θ gs(θ,Σ) dσsi (θ) +
∫
θ
θ gu(θ,Σ) dσui (θ) + (1− i)Ai
∫
θ
θ dFi(θ) (16)
+ ai
∫
θ
θ gE,u(θ,Σ) dσE,si (θ) +
∫
θ
θ gE,u(θ,Σ) dσE,ui (θ) + (1− i)AEi
∫
θ
θ dFEi (θ).
Recall that Σ(θ) = (σu1 (θ), σ
u
2 (θ)..., σ
s
1(θ), σ
s
2(θ)...) denotes the distribution of workers across sec-
tors and productivities at the beginning of the period and gji (θ,Σ), j = u, s denotes the policy
function indicating whether the worker with draw θ stayed or quit the occupation in the current
period.
Finally, the resulting law of motion for the distribution of workers are given by
σs
′
i = (1− pi) (gs(θ,Σ) σsi + γi gu(θ,Σ) σui ) , (17)
σu
′
i = (1− pi)(1− γi) gu(θ,Σ) σui + (1− i)Ai(Σ), (18)
σE,s
′
i = (1− pi)
(
gE,s(θ,Σ) σE,si + γi g
E,u(θ,Σ) σE,ui
)
, and (19)
σE,u
′
i = (1− pi)(1− γi) gE,u(θ,Σ) σui + (1− i)AEi (Σ), (20)
where the prime denotes the beginning of next period’s element.
2.1.2. The Producer’s Problem
The Producer’s problem in this environment is a simple static problem. Let pi denote the price
of each task in terms of the numeraire good; then the demand for each task is given by
ydi =
(
κiP
pi
) 1
1−ρ
Y, (21)
where P =
(
N∑
i=1
p
−ρ
1−ρ
i κ
1
1−ρ
i
) ρ−1
ρ
. (22)
where P , the price index for the final good, follows from the zero-profit condition for the final
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good’s producer.
Labour markets in each occupation are competitive, so the real wage per effective unit of
labour is the value of the marginal product in terms of the numeraire good:
wi = pi αzi (li)
α−1 , (23)
where pi is the price of each task in terms of the numeraire good. As normalization, let w1 = 1.
2.2. Stationary Equilibrium
Before studying the impact of increased trade in this environment, it is instructive to study the
stationary equilibrium first. A stationary equilibrium is characterized by a time-invariant distri-
bution of workers across skill levels and occupations, i.e. Σ′ = Σ. First, notice that in a stationary
environment the critical level of the match specific productivity is constant. As a result, a worker
either quits after the first period, or stays with the occupation until the match is exogenously
separated. Further, recall that an unskilled worker’s income is θw, and that the wage paid per
effective unit of labour is a constant, determined in a competitive market. Consequently, one
can regard the productivity draw as an income draw as well: in a stationary environment the
model reduces to a variant of the stochastic job matching model with a constant matching rate.
a. Non-Educated Workers
Using the fact that a skilled worker never quits in a stationary equilibrium, the steady state value
of being a skilled worker in occupation i with shock θ is given by
Jsi (θ,Σ) =
aiθwi
1− β(1− pi) +
βpi
1− β(1− pi)U(Σ); (24)
similarly, for an inexperienced worker in occupation i, it is as follows:
Jui (θ,Σ) = wi
1− β(1− pi)(1− γiai)
(1− β(1− pi))(1− β(1− pi)(1− γi)) +
βpi
(1− β(1− pi))U(Σ). (25)
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Here, U(Σ) denotes the value of searching.
Substituting (4) into (3) and using the optimal reservation productivity strategy, the value of
applying at any occupation i can be written as
Ui(Σ) = U(Σ) =
(1− )
1− β
[
Eθ,iwi + β
(
Fi(θˆi) +
∫ θ¯
θˆi
Jui (θ,Σ)dFi(θ)
)]
. (26)
Using (25), the condition for the reservation productivity level (8) can be rearranged to yield
θˆiwi = (1− β)U(Σ) 1− β(1− pi)(1− γi)1− β(1− pi)(1− γiai) . (27)
Lastly, after substituting (25) into (26), the fundamental reservation productivity equation can
be obtained:
θˆi = (1− i)
[
Eθ,i(θ)
1− β(1− pi)(1− γi)
1− β(1− pi)(1− γiai) +
β(1− pi)
1− β(1− pi)
∫ θ¯
θˆi
(θ − θˆi)dFi(θ)
]
. (28)
First, note that the reservation productivity level is independent of the wage rate. In a stationary
equilibrium, each occupation offers a time-invariant wage per effective unit of labour. Since
all sectors offer the same value to applicants, a worker who quits after the first period is willing
to resample with the same occupation again – and receive the same wage rate per efficiency
unit (her income θw will only change because θ changes). Therefore, the wage rate reduces to a
scaling parameter and does not have an impact on the reservation productivity level.
The interpretation of (28) is easiest after multiplying both sides with the wage rate wi. Then,
the left-hand side is the utility per period from maintaining the job at the reservation productiv-
ity, while the right-hand side is the expected utility from quitting: the expected draw in the cur-
rent period plus the discounted expected improvement. The optimal reservation level equates
these two values.
Finally, using that Ui = Uj , (27) allows solving for the relative wage between two occupations
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as
wi
wj
=
θˆj
θˆi
1− β(1− pi)(1− γi)
1− β(1− pi)(1− γiai)
1− β(1− pi)(1− γjaj)
1− β(1− pi)(1− γj) . (29)
Recall from (28) that the reservation levels are independent of the wage paid in the occupa-
tion. Thus (29) states that the steady state relative wage between sectors depends on parameters
alone; output prices only affect the overall level of wages. This is a result of the directed search in
the labour market – agents will apply to the occupation with the highest expected value, driving
down the wage paid and the value in that occupation until all occupations offer the same value
of applying. Consequently, in the steady state, all gains from trade or technological progress
are equally distributed among occupations – in the long run, trade will make all ex ante iden-
tical workers equally better off. Distributional effects arise only along the transition path and
between the different educational groups, as discussed below.
b. Educated Workers
Just as with non-educated workers, the directed search assures that all high skill occupations
offer the same expected value in steady state and, as a result, all occupations benefit equally
from trade or technological progress. Yet, the sequential nature of the application process im-
plies that the reservation productivity level depends on the relative wage between high and low
education occupations. Following the same steps as above, the reservation productivity level for
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an educated worker in a high education occupation is given by
θˆEh =
(1− β)
1− β ((1− h) + h(1− l)Ωl + hh)
[
1− β(1− pi)(1− γh)
1− β(1− pi)(1− γhah) (30)(
(1− h)Eθ,h(θ) + h(1− l)wl
wh
Bl
)
+
β(1− pi)(1− h)
1− β(1− pi)
∫ θ¯
θˆh
(θ − θˆh)dFh(θ)
]
,
with Ωl = Fl(θˆh) + (1− Fl(θˆh)) βpi1− β(1− pi) , and
Bl = EEθ (θ) + β
∫ θ¯
θˆl
θ
1− β(1− pi)(1− γlal)
(1− β(1− pi))(1− β(1− pi)(1− γl))dF
E
l (θ),
where θˆEl denotes the reservation level in low skill occupation l, andwh andwl denote the respec-
tive wage rate per effective unit of labour. Note that agents are indifferent between all sectors,
so any low education sector can be used when computing (30). The reservation level for low
education occupations, θˆEl , can be obtained similarly.
A non-educated worker effectively resamples from the same occupation until she receives
a large enough productivity draw; an educated worker, on the other hand, might not resample
from the same occupation if she quits. If an educated worker leaves a high education occupa-
tion and reapplies, she may not receive an offer and will subsequently apply to and receive an
offer from a low education occupation. As a result, the relative wage between the high and low
education occupation will affect her quitting decision. This, of course, has implications for the
distribution of the gains from trade. While the welfare gains will be equally distributed within
one group, this may not hold across groups. Depending on the terms of trade, the education
premium, the relative value of being an unemployed educated to an unemployed non-educated
U
E
(Σ)
U(Σ)
, may rise or fall; this is discussed in more detail below.
c. The Stationary Distribution
In a stationary equilibrium the productivity cut-offs are constant, consequently the distribution
across productivity levels is the underlying distribution truncated at θˆ. The total number of
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workers of each skill type follow from the skill acquisition process. Let Θ = E
(
θ|θ ≥ θˆ
)
, then
the steady state labour supply can be written as
lsi = Θi(aisi + ui) + Ei(θ)(1− i)Ai (31)
+ ΘEi (ais
E
i + u
E
i ) + E
E
i (θ)(1− i)AEi .
ui and si are the steady state numbers of skilled and unskilled workers in each occupation:
ui =
(1− i)(1− Fi(θˆ))
pi + γi − piγi Ai
si =
γi(1− δ)
pi
ui
uEi =
(1− i)(1− FEi (θˆi
E
))
pi + γi − piγi A
E
i
sEi =
γi(1− δ)
pi
uEi
and (1− E) =
∑
i
( si + ui +Ai) ,
E =
∑
i
(
sEi + u
E
i +A
E
i
)
,∑
l∈L
AEl =
∑
h∈H
hA
E
h .
In order to close the model, the goods market must be cleared – the conditions for goods
market clearing, however, depend on the trade regime.
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2.2.1. Autarky Equilibrium
The total demand for the final consumption good is equal to the total value of the output of each
occupation
Y D =
∑
i
piyi
P
. (32)
In autarky, all goods consumed must be produced domestically:
zi (lsi )
α =
(
κiP
pi
) 1
1−ρ
Y D. (33)
Together, the market clearing condition (33), the firms’ profit maximizing condition (23) and the
conditions on relative wages from the agent’s problem solve equilibrium prices, wages and the
numbers of applicants for each occupation.
Definition
A stationary competitive equilibrium for the closed economy consists of value functions V si (θ,Σ),
V ui (θ,Σ) J
s
i (θ,Σ), J
u
i (θ,Σ), J
1
i (θ,Σ) for non-educuated and the corresponding value functions
V E,si (θ,Σ), V
E,u
i (θ,Σ), J
E,s
i (θ,Σ), J
E,u
i (θ,Σ), J
E,1
i (θ,Σ) for educated workers; values of search for
non-educated and educated, U(Σ) and UE(Σ); the associated policy functions gsi (θ,Σ), g
u
i (θ,Σ),
gAi (Σ); g
E,s
i (θ,Σ), g
E,u
i (θ,Σ) and g
E,A
i (Σ); a time invariant distribution of workers across occupa-
tions and skill levels Σ; prices for each task, pi; wages in each occupation, wi, and sectorial and
aggregate output, yi and Y such that:
1. Given prices and wages, the functions V si (θ,Σ), V
u
i (θ,Σ) J
s
i (θ,Σ), J
u
i (θ,Σ), J
1
i (θ,Σ) solve
the non-educated agent’s problem and gsi (θ,Σ), g
u
i (θ,Σ), g
A
i (Σ) are the optimal policy func-
tions.
2. Given prices and wages, the functionsV E,si (θ,Σ), V
E,u
i (θ,Σ), J
E,s
i (θ,Σ), J
E,u
i (θ,Σ), J
E,1
i (θ,Σ)
solve the educated agent’s problem and gE,si (θ,Σ), g
E,u
i (θ,Σ), g
E,A
i (Σ) are the optimal pol-
icy functions.
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3. Individual decision rules gsi (θ,Σ), g
u
i (θ,Σ), g
A
i (Σ) are consistent with the invariant aggre-
gate distribution of types.
4. The distribution of workers across sectors and skill levels is time invariant: Σ′ = Σ.
5. Wages are determined competitively.
6. The labour market in each occupation clears; aggregate feasibility is satisfied.
7. The task markets and the final good market clear.
2.2.2. Trade Equilibrium
In the trade equilibrium in which a subset T of tasks are tradable, prices for tradable tasks
(pt1, pt2, ..) are taken as given and supply and demand are perfectly elastic at these prices.11 For
simplicity, assume there are no trade costs or tariffs. Thus, the labour market clearing conditions
and the relative wage conditions, together with market clearing conditions for the non tradable
tasks, determine the trade stationary equilibrium. The stationary competitive equilibrium for
the open economy differs from that of the closed economy by condition 7 and an additional
condition 8:
7. The task markets for non-tradeable tasks clear; aggregate feasibility is satisfied.
8. Trade is balanced: 0 =
∑
i∈T pi
(
ysi − ydi
)
.
3. Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I conduct the main quantitative experiment – predicting the time-path of key
labour market outcomes resulting from increased trade in high skill service tasks. I calibrate
the model to match the U.S. economy in the early 2000s, around the time when trade in (high
skill) services became more common. I then introduce trade in tasks by allowing the economy
11Since trade is balanced, the country really is faced with a set of international relative prices.
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to import or export any quantity of some tasks (those identified below in section 3.1.) at given
world prices and compute the resulting stationary equilibrium and the transition path.
Since trade in services remains a nascent phenomenon, it is difficult to predict the actual
terms of trade. Currently, we do not know which occupations will experience import-competition
and which will export, as well as the magnitude of the difference between autarky and world rel-
ative prices. When determining the ensuing trade equilibrium, I compute three hypothetical
scenarios for the trade in tasks. The first scenario is intended as the likely candidate for actual
developments in trade to arise in the future, while scenarios 2 and 3 investigate the importance
of the exact pattern and the terms of trade.
The key insight from these experiments is that the gains from trade almost exclusively de-
pend on the magnitude of the comparative advantage. While the skill content of occupations
has an impact on the transition path, it only marginally affects the aggregate gains from trade.
The skill content of imports and exports impacts the distribution of gains between educated and
non-educated workers – while all ex-ante identical agents gain equally from trade, the relative
standing of non-identical agents depends on the exact pattern of trade. If trade is biased against
high-skill occupations, educated workers may benefit little from trade and the college premium
may fall.
3.1. Trade in Tasks and Specific Human Capital - Evidence
In order to analyze and discuss the labour market implications of offshoring, it is crucial to know
which occupations are actually tradable. This, however, is not an easy task as trade in tasks is
only at its beginning. One attempt has been made by Blinder (2009), who uses the Occupational
Information Network (O*NET) database to characterize occupations by their degree of offshora-
bility.12 He finds that between 22.2% and 29.0% of all jobs are potentially offshorable.
12Two other approaches to identify tradable occupations have been proposed by Liu and Trefler (2008), who link
service import and export data (as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, BEA) to the associated occupation,
and Jensen and Kletzer (2005), who construct a geographic concentration index for occupations to classify tradable
and non-tradable occupations. While both approaches give valuable insights into occupations potentially affected by
trade in services, they both suffer from some important shortcomings. High geographic concentration of occupations
can be an indication of tradability, but is not a necessary condition. Using BEA data on currently traded services does
not identify every potentially tradable occupation since this type of trade is only in its early stages.
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Table 3.1 breaks down the employment in tradable occupations into the major occupation
groups. The first column lists the total employment for each group and the second column the
total employment within that group that is employed in tradable occupations, using Blinder’s
most conservative estimate. The third column gives the fraction of employment that is poten-
tially tradable in each group. Tradable occupations fall into four groups: managerial, profes-
sional (including technical and engineering occupations), administrative, and production oc-
cupations. The first two groups are commonly referred to as “high skill” occupations. Together,
they make up 28.3% of total employment and 36.1% of all employment in tradable occupations.
Disregarding production occupations (which have been traded in the past) these “high skill” oc-
cupations account for 52.2% of tradable employment, while making up 30.7% of the total non-
production employment. This provides a preliminary indication that workers in newly trad-
able occupations possess more human capital than workers previously exposed to offshoring.13
However, the analysis does not distinguish between specific and general human capital.
In order to discern whether occupations increasingly exposed to offshoring require high spe-
cific or general human capital, I estimate returns to occupational tenure using the Survey of In-
come and Program Participation (SIPP). In the estimation I follow Kambourov and Manovskii
(2009b), who stress the importance of occupation specific human capital, noting that after con-
trolling for occupational tenure, employer and job tenure do not contribute significantly to wage
growth. This finding led them to conclude that workers accumulate significant occupation-
specific human capital during their careers.14
Table 3.2 presents the calculated returns for occupational tenure.15 For comparison, Table
3.3 lists the returns to overall labour market experience. I find that 2 years in an occupation
increases wages by about 2.0%, and 5 and 10 years yield returns of 4.6% and 7.8%, respectively.16
13It is important to keep in mind that the tasks these occupations perform can potentially be traded and that, as a
consequence, the U.S. will not necessarily become a net importer of higher skill tasks.
14However, as in most of the previous work, the paper does not investigate how specific human capital varies
across groups. Only recently, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, Sullivan (2009) showed that there
is substantial heterogeneity across occupations in the relative importance and magnitude of occupation and industry
specific human capital.
15See Appendix A for the details on model and data.
16These returns are lower than those reported by Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b), where 5 years in an occu-
pation increase wages by 12.0% and Sullivan (2009), who reports 5-year returns of 13.3% if occupational tenure is
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Columns [c]-[f] report the returns to occupational tenure only for higher skill occupation groups.
I find that the returns to tenure in these occupations are indeed significantly higher than in the
full sample of occupations, indicating that individuals working in higher skill occupations not
only accumulate more general human capital, but also more occupation-specific human capital.
The highest returns are detected for technical occupations, with 30.3% for 10 years in a technical
occupation.
For comparison, I also estimate returns to occupational tenure in manufacturing occupa-
tions and find that they are about the same as the returns in the full sample: 3.0%, 6.0%, and
7.4% for 2, 5, and 10 years, respectively. This is in line with the intuition that occupations previ-
ously exposed to offshoring boast with less specific human capital. Furthermore, the returns to
tenure in manufacturing occupations estimated here for the second half of the 1990s and early
2000s may actually be higher than the returns in already offshored manufacturing occupations –
i.e. the manufacturing jobs that we still observe today are more human capital intensive then the
average manufacturing job in the 1970s and 80s, which have been offshored in the past. Con-
ventional wisdom is that US imports have (slightly) less skill content than exports (e.g. Wolff,
2003), which aligns with this suspicion.
3.2. Calibration
For the calibration, I rely on data from several sources. The information on occupational tenure
is drawn from the SIPP.17 Data on occupation and industry affiliation and educational attain-
ment comes from the 2000 Census 5% sample and data from the national accounts (NIPA tables)
is used to compute the labour share.
The model period is chosen to be one year, as the focus of the analysis is the long-run tran-
sition from one steady state to another rather than movements at the business cycle frequency.
This is also consistent with the modelling choice of directed search, as discussed in the previous
computed comparably. Several factors are potentially responsible, not least of which the fact that the returns to oc-
cupational tenure may have diminished since the 1980s, which represent a sizeable portion of the PSID. If the wage
increase is largest for workers switching employers and not occupations, and if these switches are correlated with
exiting the sample, the high attrition rate in the SIPP will cause a downward bias in the returns to tenure as well.
17See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the SIPP.
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section. The time discount factor, β, is taken to be 0.96, which is standard.
To be able to compute the transition path, the number of occupations must not be to large.
Therefore, I group service occupations into 6 major categories: occupations are first divided into
high and low skill (or college and non-college) occupations. Each of these groups is then sepa-
rated into inshored, offshored and non-traded, for a total of 6 groups. Production occupations
are only assigned to inshored and offshored occupations groups.
The parameters of the specific human capital process, ai and γi, are chosen to match the oc-
cupational tenure profile identified in the data. The relative productivity of workers with specific
human capital, ai, varies by occupation group and ranges from 1.07 (production occupations) to
1.31 (technical occupations). The probability of becoming skilled, γ, is assumed constant across
occupations. Observing that the wage-occupation tenure curve flattens after 8-10 years in an
occupation, I set γ at 0.125, which implies an average tenure of 9 years at the time of separation.
The distribution of match-specific productivity shocks is uniform; its mean is set to 1. As
proposed by Menzio and Shi (2009), the variance, σθ, can be selected to match the fraction of
workers in the first year of their occupational tenure. The probability of leaving an occupation
after accumulating more than one year of tenure, pi, is 0.079. This aligns with the average oc-
cupational tenure of 12.7 years at the time of an occupation switch, conditional on the switch
occurring after year 1. Figure 3.2.1 depicts how the combination of σ and pi can be used to match
the aggregate occupational tenure distribution found in the data.
The probability of not receiving an offer, , is 0.2. This implies an expected unemployment
spell of 13 weeks for a non-educated worker. While the actual average unemployment duration
measured in the data is higher than this (18.1 weeks in 2007, according to data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics), this figure is upward biased in the context of estimates for the expected un-
employment duration because longer spells are more likely to be found in the data. In light of
this fact, I use the lower estimate of 13 weeks, which is in line with estimated expected unem-
ployment durations (e.g. Valletta, 2002). Again, as a result of the sequential search by highly
educated workers, the expected length of unemployment predicted by the model for high edu-
cated workers is shorter than in the data.
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Calibrating the parameters of the production process is less straightforward due to the lack of
data available at the occupation level. For example, the labour share of output within an industry
can easily be calculated from national accounts data, but there is no comparable information
available for occupations as the output of an occupation on its own is not as easily measured.
To calibrate the labour share, α, I construct an occupation-industry matrix using the 2000
Census data; each cell in this matrix represents the fraction of the occupation’s total employ-
ment working in a given industry. For example 0.14% of all accountants are employed in cos-
metic manufacturing. From the national accounts (NIPA tables), I compute the labour shares for
15 major industry groups.18 For each occupation, the labour share is computed as the weighted
average of the labour shares in the industries in which the occupation is employed. The under-
lying assumption is that the labour share within an industry is the same across all occupations
in that industry and differences in the labour share across occupations stem from differences
across industries in which the workers in that occupation are employed in.
The productivity parameter for each task, zi, and its share in the final good production func-
tion, κ, cannot be separately identified. I therefore set κ to 1 and choose the relative magnitudes
of the respective zi to match the employment share of each occupation from the 2000 Census;
the level of each parameter is selected such that the autarky aggregate output Y A = 1. Finally,
since there is no clear target for the elasticity of substitution between tasks, I set ρ = −2.34,
which implies an elasticity of substitution of 0.3 (i.e. tasks are complements in the production
of the final good). I conduct a sensitivity analysis: as long as tasks are strong complements, the
results are materially unaffected by the exact choice of ρ.
The fraction of “high-educated” workers, E, is calibrated as follows. Calculating the fraction
of the labour force with at least “some college” education is straightforward from the Census
data. However, an educated worker may switch back and forth between college and non-college
occupations in the model. Hence, that fraction does not appear to be the empirical counterpart
to E. For consistency with the model, I therefore count all workers in high skill occupations as
18The breakdown into industries is limited by the availability of “Non-farm Proprietors’ Income” by industry,
which must be considered when computing the labour share for service occupations, where self-employment is more
important then for manufacturing occupations.
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“high educated” irrespective of their educational background. Furthermore, all workers with
college education who work in low skill occupations under the age of 30 are also counted as
“high educated” since the model allows individuals with high education to be employed in high
skill occupations regardless of their current employment. In the data, mostly younger workers
sample low-skill occupations despite their high education; such workers search heavily for the
best match, as evident by the fraction of the high-educated employed in “high degree” occupa-
tions increasing until about age 30 and remaining constant almost until the end of the work-life.
This is depicted in Figure 2.1. Assuming that older workers with a college education employed in
a lower skill job do no longer possess the qualifications for employment in a college occupation,
I only include young highly educated workers employed in lower skill occupations; this results
in E = 36.7.
3.3. The Experiment
In evaluating the trade equilibrium, I compute three hypothetical scenarios of trade in tasks.
Since this trade is still in its early stages, it is difficult to predict the exact pattern of trade i.e. the
importing occupations’ and the exporting occupations’ terms of trade. Between scenarios 1 and
3, I vary the relative size of the four tradable services occupations; between scenarios 1 and 2, I
vary the terms of trade. The scenarios are:
1. The U.S. imports and exports both high and low skill service tasks equally. For both skill
groups, the autarky employment in tradable occupations is equally split between imported
and exported tasks. The world market price is (on average) 20% lower for imported tasks
than the domestic autarky price and 20% higher for exported tasks.
2. As scenario 1, except the world market price is 30% lower than the domestic autarky price
for imported tasks and 30% higher for exported tasks.
3. The U.S. comparative advantage is biased against high skill tasks: the autarky employment
in inshored high skill occupations makes up only 30% of the total employment in tradable
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high skill occupations, while 70% of the workers are employed in offshored high-skill oc-
cupations. The shares are reversed for low skill occupations. As in scenario 1, the world
market price is 20% lower than the domestic autarky price for imported tasks and 20%
higher for exported tasks.
For all three scenarios, I assume that trade is introduced to its full extent at once and not grad-
ually. While this assumption is not necessarily particularly realistic, it maximizes the short run
adjustment cost and thus presents a useful worst case scenario. Were trade introduced very
gradually, none or only few permanent workers would switch occupations and so no destruction
of human capital would occur, which implies that there would be no short term distributional
effects.
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Steady State Comparison
Compared to the autarky steady state, the new stationary equilibrium sees welfare (output of
the final consumption good) increase in all three scenarios, as shown in Table 3.2.1. Not sur-
prisingly, the increase is most pronounced (4.03%) in scenario 2, when the differences between
autarky and trade relative prices are largest. In scenario 1, the welfare gain is 2.02%, while in
scenario 3 the gain is 1.82%. The difference in outcomes between scenarios 1 and 3 can be ex-
plained by the fact that employment in occupations with high specific human capital is higher
in scenario 1. As a result, the effective labour supply is higher, which causes a higher output of
the comparative advantage task. Nevertheless, it can be said that the terms of trade are of first
order importance from an aggregate standpoint; whether or not the offshored tasks are high or
low skill is secondary.
While the terms of trade are more crucial than the economy’s particular comparative ad-
vantage occupation for aggregate welfare, the opposite is true for the distribution of the gains
from trade. The directed search mechanism assures that all ex-ante identical agents benefit
equally from trade in steady state. However, the gains from trade are not equally distributed
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across education groups, as evident from the third and fourth rows of Table 3.2.1. If the econ-
omy has a comparative advantage in low-skill occupations (scenario 3), almost all gains from
trade are reaped by the non-educated; in the more balanced case (scenario 1), the educated
gain slightly more. The value of entering the labour force (the value of searching, in the con-
text of this model) as an educated worker relative to entering the workforce while non-educated
(the education premium) falls from 1.41 in autarky to 1.37 in scenario 3. In scenarios 1 and 2,
where the comparative advantage is more balanced between high and low skill occupations, the
education premium increases slightly to 1.419 and 1.425.
The distributional effect of trade is a result of the occupational mobility restriction for non-
educated workers in the model – the non-educated cannot be employed in high education oc-
cupations, but educated workers may work in any occupation. In other words, educated work-
ers have a comparative advantage in working in high skill occupations, or alternatively, non-
educated workers are like a specific factor. As a result, college-educated workers are able to
attain an education premium in autarky. However, in scenario 3, they are exposed to strong
import-competition, while the non-educated see the value of their specific factor increase. It is
important to point out that the number of educated workers remains constant – if agents had
the choice of becoming educated at some cost, the number of educated workers would fall in
scenario 3 and increase in scenarios 1 and 2, attenuating the education premium towards its
autarky value.
3.4.2. The Transition Path
Figures 3.2.2 - 3.2.4 display the time path of aggregate output. In scenarios 1 and 2, output ini-
tially remains almost constant and then increases quickly – within 3 years, output is close to the
equilibrium value. However, output then overshoots the new steady state level, staying notice-
ably above this level for a period of over ten years. Interestingly, the rapid increase in output and
the prolonged overshooting together cause the welfare gain including transition path to be the
same as the steady state gain – 2.02% steady state gain and 2.08% including the transition path
for scenario 1. In scenario 3, there is no overshooting; output jumps by about 1% in the first year
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and after a period of rapid growth converges to the new equilibrium value.
To better understand the time dynamics of aggregate output, it is instructive to investigate
the reallocation of workers first. Inspecting the time path of wages (Figure 3.2.6) for scenario
1,19 one can see that the initial response mirrors that of a specific factors model: the wage rate
per unit of labour (the value of the marginal product) in the inshored occupation increases by
about 4.5%, while the wage rate in the offshored occupation falls by about 21% – at the autarky
reservation productivity levels, the indifference conditions on relative wages (29) is violated.20
This triggers a reallocations process: the value of applying to the inshored occupations exceeds
the value of applying to offshored occupations and the offshored occupations do not attract
any applicants. Furthermore, because of the shift in relative wages, the value of remaining per-
manently in the offshored occupation is now lower than the value of searching for a worker
with a low specific productivity draw. The reservation productivity in offshored occupations
increases and most unskilled and even some skilled workers leave the offshored occupations
and for the inshored ones. This causes an increase in unemployment, an increase in average
worker productivity in the offshored occupations, and a decrease in average worker productivity
in the inshored occupations. Note that this implies that the average income in these occupations
changes less than the wage per effective unit of labour.
After the first period, some of the former applicants to inshored occupations become per-
manent workers and increase the effective labour supply in those occupations, which lowers
the wage rate per unit of labour. The labour supply in the offshored occupations is further re-
duced through exogenous separation, which somewhat increases the wage rate. Thus the value
of searching relative to the value of staying permanently in offshored occupations decreases;
permanent workers (skilled and unskilled) only leave their occupation in the first period after
the negative shock. However, the value of applying to the inshored occupations still exceeds
that for the offshored; just as in the first period, only the inshored occupations receive appli-
cants in the second period. Over time, the effective labour force in the offshored occupations
19The path for the other scenarios is similar, so only scenario 1 is discussed in detail.
20The wage in the offshored occupation need not fall; if the comparative advantage is strong, the wage could
potentially increase. However, it will always be lower than the trade steady state real wage.
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is further reduced through exogenous separation, while it keeps growing in the inshored – both
through entry and acquisition of specific human capital. Eventually, the value of applying to all
occupations is equalized again and both receive a positive number of applicants. The gains from
trade are now equally distributed across occupations.
The behaviour of the permanent workers’ values in either occupation, presented in Figure
3.2.7, is similar to that of wages; the value overshoots the steady state value for the exported
task and undershoots for the imported task. However, since the value function captures all
discounted future wages, the deviation from the steady state value is much smaller than for
wages.21 With trade, workers already employed in the inshored occupations are better off un-
ambiguously. On the other hand, skilled workers in the offshored occupations may see their
value rise or fall, depending on the loss in wages and the length of the transition path. For un-
skilled workers in the offshored occupation, the value similarly depends on the loss in wages
and the length of the transition path, but also on their position in the productivity distribution.
In the autarky equilibrium, a worker with a productivity shock equal to the autarky reservation
level is indifferent between quitting and staying in the occupation by definition. In the first pe-
riod after the economy opens to trade, the value of searching increases and the worker is better
off. On the other hand, the worker with the highest possible productivity level sees her value
decrease, just like a skilled worker.
Figure 3.2.7 shows the path of the value of being a skilled worker with a productivity draw at
the 67th percentile for scenario 1; the time paths for the other productivity levels follow the same
pattern. In the first year, the value of having human capital specific to the offshored occupation
falls about 3% relative to its autarky value, while the value of having human capital specific to the
inshored occupation increases by the same amount. The latter quickly converges to its steady
state value, while the former has recovered to its autarky level in 8 years and converges to the
trade steady state in about 15 years – Figure 3.2.7 best exemplifies the conflict between long
term gains and short term losses, while also stressing the importance of the specificity of human
21This also stresses the need for a dynamic model – judging the impact of increased trade based on wage levels as
in a static model overstates its impact drastically.
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capital. If all human capital were general, the transition to the new equilibrium is instantaneous
and there are no short term losses.
Now returning to the dynamics of output, the initial increase in output is a result of the econ-
omy taking advantage of its comparative advantage paired with the reallocation of workers from
the offshored to the inshored occupation. All but the most productive unskilled and also some
of the less productive high skill workers are leaving the offshored occupation and apply to the
inshored occupation, as discussed above. However, since some of these workers do not receive
an offer in the first year and others receive a low productivity draw, aggregate output in the first
period is only slightly increased – the effective labour force employed in the economy in the first
year is smaller than in autarky. Yet, at world relative prices, the value of output is higher and
aggregate output does not fall. By the end of the third year, most workers who switched receive
a productivity draw above the reservation level, i.e. they find a good occupation match in one of
the inshored occupations, and output increases significantly.
At the same time, the average productivity of the workers remaining in the offshored occu-
pation is very high, as only skilled and unskilled workers with a high productivity shock remain.
This causes aggregate output to overshoot in scenarios 1 and 2: after three periods, the effective
labour force in the inshored occupation is markedly increased, while it still remains relatively
high in the offshored occupation because of the high average productivity. In scenario 3, just as
in scenarios 1 and 2, two opposing forces affect aggregate output in the first period: the positive
comparative advantage effect and the negative reallocation effect. Since the former is stronger
in scenario 3 than in scenarios 1 and 2, output already increases significantly (by 1%) in the first
period. Furthermore, because of the strong comparative advantage effect, output does not over-
shoot: the high productivity workers who separate from the offshored occupation over time do
not see the value of their product decrease because the price of their output increases more than
their productivity falls.
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3.5. The Impact on the Wage Distribution
The distribution of wages is affected through three channels as wage dispersion in the model
comes from three sources: agents vary by their education, their acquired specific skill and their
match-specific productivity draw. In the short run, the inequality within offshored occupation
will be reduced and within the inshored occupation increased. Only permanent workers re-
main in the offshored occupations, eliminating the left tail of the productivity distribution. Fur-
thermore, the increase in the productivity cut-off further truncates the distribution and also
eliminates more unskilled than skilled workers. In other words, only good matches and mostly
workers with high specific human capital remain in the offshored occupation.
The inshored occupation will attract more applicants, i.e. more workers in their first year
of tenure. Since workers in their first year of occupational tenure can have productivity shocks
below the reservation level as well as above, both sources of within-inequality are amplified in
the short term.
In the long term, however, the reservation productivity level is unchanged, and so is the rel-
ative number of first year, permanent unskilled to skilled workers within an occupation. Conse-
quently, offshoring does not affect the residual inequality within occupation. In the long term
changes to the wage distribution can only stem from changes of the occupational composition
of the economy. However, changes to the occupational composition can cause changes to the
education premium. If trade is biased against high skill occupations, as in scenario 3, demand
for college graduates falls which lowers the college premium. While the competitive forces of
the labour market assure that ex-ante identical workers gain equally from trade, different agents
may gain differently. College educated workers have a comparative advantage in high skill oc-
cupations. If the tasks that are being offshored are produced in these occupations, college ed-
ucated workers gain relatively less from trade. However, even under scenario 3, in which trade
is strongly biased against high skill occupations, college graduates still gain from increased off-
shoring.
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3.6. Labour Market Frictions
Finally, I conduct an experiment to investigate the potential role of flexible labour market insti-
tutions in the transition from an autarky to a trade equilibrium. In the model, labour market
frictions are captured by , the probability of receiving an offer if searching in the current period.
Also, one can think of pi, the arrival rate for exogenous separation, as capturing labour market
institutions such as the imposition of firing costs. For this experiment, I increase  from 0.2 to
0.3, thus increasing the expected length of unemployment to 22.3 weeks. Also, I reduce pi to
0.050 (from 0.079) which implies an average tenure of 21 years at separation. I also recalibrate
the task productivity parameters z; all other parameters are kept unchanged to focus on the im-
pact of labour market institutions.22 Together, these changes leave the steady state gains from
trade almost unchanged – in steady state, the gains under scenario 1 represent a 2.07% increase
in aggregate output.
The importance of strong labour market institutions for the transition can best be demon-
strated by comparing the path of aggregate output to that generated in the initial experiment
(Figure 3.2.8). First, output falls upon impact in the first period dues to the lower job finding
rate; i.e. a larger number of workers who choose to leave their occupations in response to the
trade shock do not receive another job offer, thus becoming unemployed. This also causes out-
put growth to slow down: in the economy with frictions, output takes 7 years to reach the steady
state level (as opposed to 3 in the calibrated economy). The output growth is further slowed by
the lower exogenous separation – a worker who decided not to quit in the first period will remain
in the offshored occupation until her occupation-match is destroyed. As a consequence, these
workers to remain in the offshored occupation for a longer period of time.
Together, the lower job-finding rate and the lower separation rate have a noticeable impact
on the transition and hence on welfare. In this simple experiment, the steady state increase in
aggregate output is 2.07%, but the total welfare gain decreases to 1.79% after taking the transition
path into account. This stands in contrast with the calibrated model with fewer labour market
22One could argue that such an environment is likely to produce higher levels of specific human capital (e.g.
Wasmer, 2006); an exercise such as calibrating the model to continental Europe is left for future research.
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frictions in which the welfare improvement including the transition path actually exceeded the
steady state gains. Although the difference is not staggering, it is larger than the difference be-
tween the steady state welfare gains for scenarios 1 and 3.
4. Conclusion
This paper develops a model of trade in tasks in which occupation-specific human capital plays
a pivotal role in determining the transition path after the country opens up to offshoring. Using
this model, I demonstrate that the characteristics of the traded tasks are of secondary impor-
tance for the magnitude of the gains from trade – the key determinant of the gains from trade is
the difference between autarky and trade relative prices and not the skill content of the traded
tasks. As in other models of trade, the more different trading partners are, the larger the gains
from trade. The distribution of the gains from trade critically depends on the time horizon: in the
short term, workers with human capital specific to the inshored occupation gain, while workers
with human capital specific to the offshored occupation loose. In the long run, when the dis-
tribution of specific human capital is endogenous, the gains from trade are equally distributed
among identical agents. Agents with different characteristics, e.g. ability to go to college, may
gain differently if trade is biased against high or low skills.
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Table 3.2.1: Steady State Comparison
Autarky Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Output 1 1.0202 1.0403 1.0182
Unemployment 2.97% 2.97% 2.97% 2.95%
U
E,Trade
/U
E,Autarky
1.0236 1.0462 1.0032
U
Trade
/U
Autarky
1.0172 1.0355 1.0319
U
E
/U
1.4100 1.4189 1.4247 1.3708
(“College Premium”)
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Figure 2.1: Fraction of Educated Working in College Occupation
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Figure 3.2.1: Distribution of Tenure in Occupation
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Figure 3.2.2: Transition Path Y , Scenario 1
OFFSHORING AND HUMAN CAPITAL 46
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
1.008
1.01
1.012
1.014
1.016
1.018
1.02
1.022
1.024
Transition Path - Output
YT
/Y
A
Years
Figure 3.2.3: Transition Path Y , Scenario 2
OFFSHORING AND HUMAN CAPITAL 47
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
1.01
1.015
1.02
1.025
1.03
1.035
1.04
1.045
Years
YT
/Y
A
Transition Path - Output
Figure 3.2.4: Transition Path Y , Scenario 3
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APPENDIX A: Estimation of Specific Human Capital
Following the empirical literature measuring returns to tenure,23 I estimate the following earnings equa-
tion:
lnwijmnt = β1EmpTenijt + β2OccTenimt (A-1)
+ β3IndTenint + β4WorkExpit + αXijmnt + κijmnt,
where wijmnt is the real hourly wage of worker i at employer j in occupation m and industry n. WorkExp
denotes overall labour market experience, while EmpTen, OccTen and IndTen denote tenure with the
current employer, occupation and industry, respectively. X is a set of observables which influence wages
independently of tenure: gender, race, educational attainment, union status, firm size, 1-digit industry
and occupation affiliation, and state and year fixed effects. κijmnt an error term decomposed as follows:
κijmnt = µi + λij + ξim + νin + it,
where µi is an individual-specific component and λij , ξim, νin are job-match, occupation-match, and
industry-match components, respectively. These unobserved components pose a potentially serious
challenge in estimating the returns to tenure consistently; workers with good employer (occupation/ in-
dustry) matches, for example, may be more likely to have remained with their employer (occupation/
industry) longer while at the same time receiving a higher wage due to the excellent match quality. Esti-
mating (A-1) using Ordinary Least Squares will therefore likely result in upward-biased estimates. Thus,
I follow the approach developed by Altonji and Shakotko (1987), which has been widely adopted in the
literature and employ an instrumental variable estimation strategy.
The standard instruments for experience and the three tenure variables are the deviations of experi-
ence/tenure for individual i from the individual’s mean experience/tenure in the observed spell. If Tit is
the current tenure of worker i, the corresponding instrument is T˜it =
(
Tit − Ti
)
, where Ti is the average
tenure of individual i in the current spell. The instruments are orthogonal to their respective match com-
ponents by construction. Unfortunately, they are not necessarily orthogonal to the other match compo-
nents; e.g. the instrument for occupation tenure, ˜OccTenimt =
(
OccTenimt −OccTenim
)
, are potentially
still be correlated with the job-match unobserved effect λij . For example, an individual with a good em-
23See, among others: Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Neal (1995), Altonji and Williams (2005), and Kambourov and
Manovskii (2009b).
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ployer, but bad occupation match might be less inclined to switch occupations than an otherwise identi-
cal individual with a bad job match because switching occupations most likely also results in loosing the
good employer match.
Table A.1 presents the resulting coefficient estimates of a specification of (A-1) which includes quadratic
and cubic terms for all tenure (3-digit classification level) and experience terms. The returns to occupa-
tional tenure reported in 3.2 are computed from these results.
Data
The dataset of individual employment profiles used to estimate (A-1) comes from the 1996 and 2001
waves of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The advantage of using the SIPP is the
relatively large sample size in comparison with other panel data sets, which unfortunately results in a
trade-off with relatively short panel length (4 and 3 years, respectively). The size of the dataset allows an
estimation of the returns despite the relatively short sample and ensures a justified departure from using
data from the 1980s and early 1990s, which is advantageous for three reasons. Firstly, many of the occupa-
tions now exposed to offshoring were neither fully developed nor common some 20 years ago; secondly,
since there is no reason to believe that the returns to tenure are constant over time even as the returns
to schooling have evolved, including earlier years of data would likely not produce estimates most rele-
vant to current discussions on offshoring. Finally – and most importantly – the SIPP data was collected
at a monthly frequency, with individuals responding to one interview every four months. This allows a
much more reliable identification of job switchers – something that posed a significant challenge in pre-
vious studies using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, PSID (Brown and Light, 1992), and the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, NLSY.
Respondents in the SIPP are asked to give the start- (and end-) dates for every job, allowing me to
obtain very reliable information on employer tenure and thus circumvent the issue of initialization. In
the very first interview, the respondent is asked how long she has been working in the current “line of
work”, which allows me to initialize occupational tenure as well. There is, unfortunately, no information
on initial industry tenure; here initialize industry tenure together with occupation tenure. Finally, since
I do not observe an individual from the time she enters the labour market, I have no information on
her actual acquired overall work experience. However, the SIPP provides very detailed information on
schooling, so I can use potential experience - age less 6 less numbers of years of schooling - as a proxy for
actual experience. To minimize the resulting bias, I restrict the sample to male full-time workers.
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In each interview, the respondent is asked retrospectively about the past four months, and the re-
sponses are recorded for each month individually. The individual reports employer, occupation and in-
dustry classifications, hours worked, and total income. She also reports start- and end-dates for each job,
which allows me to identify job switches and calculate employer tenure with comparatively high preci-
sion.24 Following Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b), occupation and industry switches are only coded
as “true” switches if they coincide with employer switches. Using this convention, 20.2% of participants
switch their employers at least once per 12 months; 14.5% switch occupations, and 13.5% industries.
These shares are somewhat lower than their PSID equivalents in Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) and
Sullivan (2009) - a possible explanation is that workers who lose their job may be more likely to leave the
sample. Since the SIPP has relatively high sample attrition, this could explain fewer job, occupation, and
industry switches in this sample.
24Nevertheless, there is a significant seam bias in the data; more switches happen “at the seam”, or between inter-
views (e.g. between months 4 and 5, 8 and 9) than within interviews (e.g. between months 1 and 2, 2 and 3). However,
since I am not interested in estimating a hazard function, this bias is a minor issue and causes only a small error when
calculating tenure - at the most 3 months.
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